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I. INTRODUCTION

The wave of privatization programs now sweeping throughout Latin
America represents a fundamental shift in the legal, political, and economic
regimes that have dominated the region for the greater part of the twentieth
century. The 1980's witnessed a dramatic transition from military, totalitarianled governments to more democratic, capitalist-oriented regimes.' The legal and
economic framework within which these new governments will have to function
will be based primarily on free market principles. This important precept,
combined with the staggering foreign debt left by their predecessors, has brought
to the new Latin American leaders the recognition that longterm economic
development will depend on free market forces, not state-run forces.
Interestingly, many Latin American countries have ratified new constitutions
which affirmatively state that the free market will be the primary economic fuel
to run the state engine.2 With the prospect of a free trade agreement with the
United States looming on the horizon, the Mexican government has begun to

*J.D., American University, Washington College of Law; LL.M., University of Miami School
of Law.
I In South America, for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay all became
democratic during the 1980's.
2
Brazil and Perd are just two examples of countries that have recently ratified new constitutions
with just such provisions.

1991]

Mexican Privatization

target large sectors of the country's economic and industrial base for
privatization.3 Indeed, privatization has become crucial for Mexico's economic
future. If the proposed U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is signed,
Mexican industry will have to compete freely alongside more experienced,
technologically-advanced American corporations. Moreover, if the FTA is
extended to cover the entire hemisphere, Mexican companies will also have to
compete freely with Canadian and other Latin American industries. Today's
Mexican industry, heavily subsidized and protected by high tariffs, is illequipped to compete in such a free market. Privatization, then, remains
Mexico's only sure chance to successfully compete with other countries.
This article has a twofold objective. First, it seeks to present a brief
analysis of the Mexican privatization program. To this end, it discusses the
scope of the program, its success in industries that have already gone through
the privatization process, the manner in which the program is being
implemented, and the way in which private investors, both foreign and domestic,
can benefit from it. Second, since an analysis of the Mexican privatization
program would not be complete without taking into consideration the enormous
debt burden that confronts the country, this article discusses the privatization of
the Mexican banking industry. In doing so, it seeks to show how the
privatization of financial institutions can relieve the economic pressures imposed
by foreign debt.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE MEXICAN PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM

President Salinas' Privatization Program is one of the most far-reaching
economic measures ever introduced in the Mexican state. The program includes
the denationalization of telecommunications, transportation, banking, steel,
shipping and related industries. 4 President Salinas, however, has pledged to the
Mexican people that certain industries - i.e. industries characterized as strategic
by the country's constitution - would remain in the public domain. 5 This
includes railroads, electric power plants, and the extraction of oil and uranium.'
Nevertheless, evidence continues to mount that even these sacred industries
could soon be sitting on the auction block. A good example is Mexico's highly
protected petrochemical industry, which is suddenly being opened up to private
investors. 7

3 See Shoreham, Privatization Gains New Momentum, EuROMONEY, Mar. 1990, at 105.
4 See Appendix 1 for a list of some of the major industrial companies to be privatized.
S See Gardels, Mexico's Move to the Market, New Perspectives Quarterly, Fall 1990, at 291.
(Interview with Mexico's Foreign Minister Fernando Solana).
6

1d. at43.

'

Layton & Turner, Mexico Opens Doorfor PrivateSector, CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 30, 1989,

at 25.

U. Miami Y.B. Int'7 Law

[VOL.'I

The Secretariat of Energy, Mines, and Parastate Companies (SEMIP), the
government department which, inter alia, oversees the petrochemical industry,
publishes a basic list which enumerates those products that can be manufactured
only by Petr6leos Mexicanos (PEMEX).
Recently, SEMIP reduced the
number of petroleum products on the basic list from 34 to 20.' The products
removed from the basic list are now considered secondary products, and,
therefore, non-Mexicans are now able to form partnerships with Mexicans
manufacturers for the production of those products. The Mexican partners,
however, must hold a minimum of 60 percent of the undertaking. Interestingly,
the government has also begun to reclassify secondary products so that foreign
companies can produce them at wholly owned facilities, and the figures are
staggering. The government's reclassification scheme has reduced the number
of petrochemical products on the secondary list from 605 to 66. This major
shift has resulted in the privatization of 75 percent of Mexico's petrochemical
industry. 10
Furthermore, the government is still considering several proposals which
would divide PEMEX into five distinct companies, each of which would be open
to private investment.' 1
Indeed, President Salinas' argument that the
economically strategic oil industry will not be privatized is not completely true;
rather, it is serving as a smoke screen to appease domestic critics who argue that
he is giving away the Mexican store, and as a bargaining chip in his free trade
negotiations with the United States. In any event, although the transference of
product lines from Pemex to the private sector will amount to certain economic
and technological gains, the impact on overall exports, at least in the short run,
will probably be low. Yet, the long term economic health of Pemex will still
depend on private investment. Given the fact that the petrochemical industry has
historically been such an important strand in the web of Mexican state
nationalism, its dissolution signals that Mexico has embarked on a new economic
era.
Moreover, Privatization may in reality be the only sure way for Pemex to
obtain the capital and technology that it so desperately needs. As one U.S.
chemical executive has noted,

SId.
id. See also Appendix 2.
Robinson, Privatization'sQuickening Pace, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1990, at 13.

10

IId. at 13. Mr. Rogelio Ramirez de la 0, Director of Ecanal, a consulting firm concerned
with economic affairs has argued that "eventually PEMEX has to go on the market." Baker, Borrus
& Weiner, Mexico, A New Economic Era, BusINEsswEEK, Nov. 12, 1990, at 108.
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Pemex spent the last year (1989)... going around the world inviting
companies like us, the Europeans, and the Japanese to take part in joint
ventures offering financial packages as well as payments in kind for
technology brought into such ventures [,] and a market franchise for the
output. But the idea 'didn't fly' and the move of more than five
hundred products from the secondary to non-secondary list evidences
that failure. Nobody showed interest in the last year [,] but if a lot of
companies had, this reclassification would not have come about.2
Certainly, foreign corporations had reservations about investing capital in an
organization known for its corruption and inefficiency. Yet, after products in
the SEMIP's list were reclasiffied, private investors took charge of a major
segment of the industry, and capital investment by private actors climbed to
several billion dollars."
The Mexican privatization program has become much more widespread and
pervasive than anyone could have predicted. First, the program covers more
industries than expected. Second, in terms of raw figures, the number of
businesses that have gone private has been astonishing. For example, of the
1,155 industries owned by the state in 1983, only 496 remained in government
hands by the Spring of 1990.14 Of these, 130 were privatized. The remaining
entities were liquidated, transferred to the state or local governments or merged
with other existing companies.
Critics of former President Miguel de la Madrid's privatization program
argue that, until 1987, Mexico's much touted privatization initiative was largely
an illusion." They claim that, although Sefior de la Madrid would boast that
he was responsible for a substantial reduction in publicly owned entities, most
of that reduction was the product of the "dissolution of paper companies, the
merger of small firms, or the mere transference of entities from the national
government to the state government and to government affiliated unions.""6
They contend that, as a result, the impact on the federal budget was almost
infinitesimal and so was its ultimate effect on the government payrolls. 17 Yet,
even these critics have begun to change their minds as President Salinas dangles
the family jewels in front of private investors. Indeed, the Government has

12Layton & Turner, supra note 7, at 25.
13INTITUTE

FOR INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMICs, LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH

HAS HAPPENED? 160 (Williamson ed. 1990).
14Id.

1SMexican Privatization, Getting Down to Business, THE ECONOMIST, May 7, 1988, at 65.
16Id.
17Id.

190
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started the privatization of major Mexican transportation and communication
firms. It has also admitted privately that port facilities and other sales to private
investors are currently under consideration." 8 The most significant event with
respect to the privatization of transport occurred on April 16, 1988, when the
Mexican government declared AeroMgxico bankrupt.' 9
II. AEROMEXICO'S PRIVATIZATION: THE BEGINNING OF
THE END FOR STATE OWNED INDUSTRY
On April 13, 1988, 7000 employees at Mexico's state owned Airline,
AeroMgxico, went on strike to protest the government's decision to terminate
several uneconomical routes and sell thirteen of the company's planes.2" Only
three days later, the government broke the union by declaring the company
bankrupt and sacking its workers. 2 Union leaders were up in arms over the
government's decision, charging that the airline's financial problems were the
result of its government appointed managers. 22 The government responded by
selling the airline's remaining 26 jets to Aeronaves de Mgxico, which
restructured and streamlined the company.23 Today, AeroMxico is as strong
as it has ever been. In fact, in September 1988, a group of Mexican and foreign
investors, including British raider Sir James Goldsmith and Chase Manhattan
Bank, paid $140 million for a 25 percent managing share in Mexicana
Airlines.24 The new capital will assist the carrier in updating its fleet so that
it can effectively compete with airlines such as "AeroMxico [,J which went
private last year and has been winning over passengers with hitherto unheard of
2
on time flights.
AeroMgxico's privatization represents a turning point in the Mexican state's
approach to economic affairs. What it has brought to Mexican economic
thinking is an idea that those of us north of the border have taken for granted
throughout our history: the notion that in order to maintain and develop
economically, an industry must make consumer satisfaction a top priority.
Under state administration, Aeromdxico had a bottomless source of funds, and

's See Bussey & Work, Bienvenidos to a Fire Sale, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16,
1989, at 100.
19See Mexican Privatization, supra note 15, at 65.

0 Id.
21 See Baker, For Salinasthe Real Campaign is Just Beginning, BusiNESswEEK, Dec. 5, 1989,
at 48.
' See Mexican Privatization, supra note 15, at 66.
2

Id.

24

See Bussey & Work, supra note 18, at 100.

2 Id.
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service to customers took a backseat. This led to its demise as a state
enterprise, and to its resurrection as a private company. In private hands,
corporate funding will come out of consumer pockets. Under Mexico's old
economic arrangements, bureaucrats and trade unionists placed a noose around
the neck of the Mexican state from which its economy could not escape.
President de la Madrid and his successor Carlos Salinas de Gortari decided to
untie the noose because they realized that the state's economic resources and
Mexican citizens would be suffocated unless drastic measures were taken.
Commentators have referred to Mexico's privatization as "perestroika"26 and
"Salinastroika" 27 and to Mr. Salinas' economic thinking as "Thatcherite" due to
Mexico's extreme economic restructuring.' Mexicans have obviously taken
the decision that they do not want to continue to serve as economic oxygen tanks
for poorly managed state-owned industries such as AeroMexico. Indeed, I would
mark the AeroMrico privatization as a red letter date in Mexican history, for
it represents a point of departure from which other major Mexican industries
will be privatized.
III. DEREGULATION: CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR
PRIVATE INDUSTRY TO FLOURISH

A. The Trucking Decontrol Program
In addition to the privatization program currently underway in the transport
industry, the Commerce and Transport Ministries have initiated a major
deregulation program."g The program involves overhauling the rules restricting
highway cargo transport and the elimination of ninety regulations dealing with
packaging and containers.3" The deregulation program has successfully
changed the structural framework within which the Mexican trucking industry
has to operate.3" The former regulatory scheme was dominated by an archaic

set of laws that produced vast inefficiency throughout an industry overseen by
a small number of regional "chieftains".32 Drivers were given specific routes
and were often required to return to their original point of departure with empty
I Baker, supra note 21, at 100.
I Hoosie, Mexico's Salinastroika,WORLD PRESS REviEw, Apr. 1990, at 62.
1 Bussey & Work, supra note 18, at 100.
29Id.
3 id.
3 Neuman, Trucking Decontrol: Truckers Say It Works, Shippers Say Same Service,
OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL, Oct. 30, 1990, at 6A.
32

Id.
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loads. 3
The newly introduced deregulation program permits truckers to operate in
all corners of the country.3 4 Efficiency and service have dramatically
improved. The Secretariat of Trade. and Industry (SECOFI) has estimated that
close to $600 million will be saved this year alone as a result of increased
efficiency. This savings is due to new regulations allowing truckers to backhaul,
effectively increasing capacity by roughly ten percent over night. The program
has also brought truckers who were unregistered, operating with out-of-date
permits, or hauling unauthorized loads, into the new regulatory fold.3" This
is the case because they will no longer be bound by layers of regulatory
procedures.3 6 This informal sector has now 35,000 vehicles registered with the
government. Under the new system, permits can easily be obtained within two
weeks of submission of an application. At one time, this process consumed
between nine months to two years.
The larger Mexican trucking corporations have clearly benefited most from
the deregulation. 37 In fact, many smaller companies have sought affiliation
with the larger ones in order to remain competitive and expand their service
areas. Yet, smaller companies have benefited by their ability to serve the lesser
traveled routes which the bigger companies have avoided because of their
relatively low profitability.
B. The Salinas Balancing Act: InitiatingBold Legislative Enactments within
the Confines of a Hitherto Intransigent PoliticalStructure
The deregulation prong of the Salinas privatization initiative establishes
another point of this analysis. That is, can a country that has embarked on a
major economic structural change resist the temptation of state intervention when
its basic political framework has remained essentially intact? The answer here
is yes. In fact, as demonstrated by the success of the trucking decontrol
program, not only has the government gone as far as privatizing the industry,
it has also opened up markets for competition. Even former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher didn't have to do that during her privatization

3 Id.

3 Id.
35See Neuman, supra note 31, at 6A.
36Id.

37d.
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program, for Great Britain already had open markets. 3" When Mrs. Thatcher
came to power, she had a mandate to sweep socialism from the United
Kingdom. Mr. Salinas did come to power with a mandate for change, but he
still must operate within the confines of a political machine that is resistant to
losing many of its privileges. The deregulation program shows Mr. Salinas'
willingness to go out on a limb and interject true market forces into the Mexican
economy. Opponents within his own party abound, and Mr. Salinas has
suffered severe criticisms as a result of his decisions. In fact, many have called
his privatization program a "national giveaway," 39 arguing that sales of stateowned companies are not very lucrative.' In 1989, Mr. Salinas tried to allay
fears that he was giving away the store by vowing that the government would
fulfill its revolutionary mandate to deliver social justice, including state
ownership of gasoline, electricity, trains, telegraphs and most banking
services." With the success of privatization in other areas, however, Mr.
Salinas has realized that perhaps such a revolutionary mandate is not consistent
with Mexico's current economic needs, and has placed the telephone company
and the country's banks before the bidders.
Having discussed the widespread nature of the privatization program, its
success to date, and the political tightrope that President Salinas has had to walk
to achieve much of what has been gained, let us now turn to a privatization that
is currently taking place and see how the government privatizes a state-owned
industry.

IV. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE PRIVATIZATION
PROGRAM: How IT WORKS

Anyone who has ever visited Mexico or done business there has no doubt
at one time or another had to confront what many regard as the antithesis of a
communication system: Telgfonos de Mgxico or TELMEX. One would, expect
that any nation, particularly a Latin American one, would face enormous
opposition to a governmental decision to privatize the national telephone system
- the communication life blood of a country. Yet, in the case of Mexico, there
has been little opposition to the President's decision to privatize TELMEX. As
one observer has noted, "privatizing TELMEX would more likely spark

8 The Thatcher analogy is probably least applicable here because Mr. Salinas is operating
within the PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional (PRI), a political party which has been historically
associated with stateism and that has dominated Mexican politics for the greater part of this century.
11 Bussey & Work, supra note 18, at 100.
4

Id.

41

Id.
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celebration than national opposition: frustrated callers have come to associate the
company with extortionist repairmen and crossed lines, not national pride."42
Certainly, stories about TELMEX's inefficiency are legendary, and the
following case of Banamex is a poignant example of how TELMEX's
inefficiency, were it to continue, would stymie production and economic growth
in the country.
Banamex, Mexico's largest bank, began construction of a central computer
facility and contacted TELMEX to connect 200 telephone lines to its leading
branches in five cities across the country.43 TELMEX tendered a bid for
$860,000 and a completion date some two years away." Naturally, Banamex
refused to wait that period of time and pay those bloated costs.45 Instead, the
company made the decision that it would be more efficient to carry out the job
itself. Thus, Banamex purchased a microwave uplink and set up its own phone
network. The two hundred lines became operational quite rapidly. Obviously,
privatization became inevitable. In fact, even the workers of the telephone
'company voted unanimously to go private in order to obtain the better salaries
that could only come from economic expansion. Certainly, without state funds
for expansion, the only solution was privatization.
The privatization of TELMEX, in its final days at the time of this writing,
is expected to raise the company's service to international standards. It presents
what I consider to be a substantive portrait of how the federal government is
handling the privatization of non-strategic companies. According TELMEX's
General Manager, Alfredo Barranda, four criteria are being utilized in the
selection of a buyer for TelMex."
1. Price Although price is a major component in the selection process, Mr. Barranda
has stated categorically that it will not be the only determinant in choosing the
company's future owners.4'
Furthermore, Mr. Barranda has refused to
comment on how much money the government hopes to obtain in the sale of
TELMEX. What Mr. Barranda has stated is that given the fact that 20.4
percent of the company is now for sale, an amount which would provide its

42 Baker, supra note 21, at 105.
13

See Shoreham, supra note 3, at 105.

44Id.
4

Id.

"Mexican Telephone Service Should rise to InternationalStandardsAfter Sale, 7 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA 1847) Dec. 5, 1990.
7

Id.
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purchaser with administrative control of TELMEX, the government would
expect the purchase figure to exceed the current market price of between $1.7
and $1.8 billion.
2. A Guarantee of Growth and Service Improvement The Mexican Government will seek guarantees from the purchasing party
Such guarantees will be
for improvements in TELMEX's operations."
required despite the fact that recent changes in the national tax code contain a
variety of economic incentives which permit TELMEX to reduce or eliminate
a 29 percent tax by deductions accrued through its investment programs. The
Mexican government can determine which buyer has the wherewithal to improve
TELMEX's performance using the second requirement as a guide. Clearly such
assurances should be provided to the government no matter what company is on
the auction block. The data which the government will employ to verify such
guarantees is still unclear but is likely to center around the purchaser's past
performance in other ventures.
3. Technological Improvement The government will seek out needed technology, currently unavailable in
Mexico, from foreign partners taking part in the bidding.49 That is precisely
the reason why the government has mandated that Mexicans who are
participating in the bidding have a foreign partner. This is a sure fire way for
TELMEX to rapidly improve the service that it provides across Mexico. At
least, that is what the government is banking on.
4. InternationalInvestment This component seeks to transform TelMex into an investor in international
foreign
communications.'
or
While the foregoing determinants do not represent a hard and fast rule by
which buyers will be determined, they are generic criteria which a purchaser of
any public industry must take into account. At the time of this writing, just two
of the three bidders have named their foreign partners. The third bidder has
submitted a plan which would accept the participation of any willing foreign
partner selected by the Mexican Government. Mexican bidders and their foreign
partners include:

4

8

49

d.

Id.

0 Id.
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(1) The Mexican stock exchange firm, Acciones y Valores, headed by
Roberto Hernndez, with Telef6nica Espanola and GTE;
(2) The Carso Group, headed by Mexican investor Carlos Slim, with
Southwestern Bell and France Cable et Radio; and
(3) The Generator Group of Monterrey in Northern Mexico. The group,
headed by Javier Garza Septdlveda, submitted a bid without a foreign
partner, but, as previously stated, has offered to enter into a partnership
agreement with a company chosen by the Mexican government.51
Given the requirement that majority control of TELMEX must be in national
hands, 20.4 percent of the company for sale will be combined with a minimum
of 10.4 percent of the company going to a Mexican partner, and up to 10
percent to a foreign partner. This will still permit the private investor to retain
administrative control of the company because in early 1990 TELMEX gave
each stock holder 1.5 non-voting "L" shares for every share already owned. 2
This created a large volume of non-voting shares. The Mexican Government,
which retains 51 percent of the company, owns 20.4 percent of AA voting
shares, now up for sale, and over 30 percent of the "L" stock. According to
Mr. Barranda, the government's "L" shares will be sold in both domestic and
foreign stock markets, but significant amounts will only be sold as timing
warrants.
TELMEX has geared up for the sale during the past year by going through
a thorough restructuring combined with fiscal reforms that are likely to continue
once the new buyer takes over. For example, a number of taxes that ranged
from 22 to 72 percent have been eliminated " In addition, rates for internal
service have increased, while international long distance rates, which at one time
were three times as costly as long distance rates in most other nations, have
fallen. It is hoped that long distance rates will remain low enough so that when
competition for international service is permitted in five to six years, the
competing companies will be virtually forced to keep their international rates
low. The effect of these rate changes will be to increase the income that the
company receives from every phone line from about $400 to $700 a year.'
The company has also gone to great pains to improve its current fiscal
condition, and some of the methods that it has utilized are quite novel. For
example, the company has purchased $670 million of debt on the international
S Id. at 3.
52

Id. at 4.

3 Id.

4 id. at 5.
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market at a discount and has used that purchase to discount its own $1.1 billion
debt. Furthermore, the company has made great strides in adding 650,000 new
telephone lines without enlarging its 50,000 employee work force. Moreover,
union relations remain very good because workers are obviously much more
concerned about maintaining their. employment status and improving their
company's service than making sure their wage increases stay on an even keel
with company profits. Thus, the well respected union leader Francisco
Herndndez Judrez has struck a bargain: the union modified job descriptions in
exchange for a promise from the company that jobs would be preserved.55
Regarding the agreement, President Salinas said "The workers of the telephone
company voted unanimously for privatization because they knew the only way
of obtaining better salaries and maintaining their employment was with
expansion that could only come from the injection of additional resources from
private investors." 6 Clearly, the courting of labor has been a primary
component of the President's strategy. Indeed, organized labor's intransigence
could potentially destroy the entire Salinas initiative. TELMEX, however, is an
extraordinary example of union cooperation with the government, and is in many
ways a testament to President Salinas' dynamic political ability. Finally, the
company has been freed from the requirement that it obtain government approval
before taking major decisions.57
TELMEX's departure from state ownership is significant, not only in a
domestic Mexican context, but in a Latin American context as well. First, if
communications rise to international levels as the Mexican government and
economic commentators have asserted, it could serve as an impetus for the
privatization of communication systems in other Latin American countries, many
of which have already begun privatization programs of their own.5" Second,
as the world's fourth largest privatization, the transfer of TELMEX will be a
guage on how smoothly and efficiently the Mexican government is able to
effectuate privatization programs of scale. Third, the ability of the new owners
of TELMEX to control and bring order to the rank and file of the union, after
the privatization process has been completed, will be the final indication of
whether TELMEX will improve and expand efficiently.
It is obvious from the economic restructuring within the corporation, that
the Mexicans hope to deliver a company that will be well situated for future
international competition. It is important to keep in mind that although

s See Shoreham, supra note 3, at 109.
5

I'd.

s See Mexican Telephone Service, supra note 46, at 5.
5 See, e.g., the new Privatization statute recently enacted by the Peruvian Congress in Amado,
Peru'sNew Investment Laws: Privatization and Foreign Investment Statutes, 1 U. MIAmI Y.B.
INT'L L. 392 (1991).
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privatization may at first blush appear to be an economic bonanza both for major
corporate investors as well as the government, it can only be a bonanza if the
company is placed on a sound financial footing prior to its sale. This obviously
requires a significant amount of work. Fiscal health, however, makes the
company more attractive to investors and in turn will result in a higher purchase
price for the country. The privatization of TELMEX demonstrates the great
strides that the Mexican government has made along these lines.
V. MExIco's BANKS: BALANCING THE BUDGET BY
SELLING A KEY NATIONAL ASSET
When the President of Mexico announced his intention to privatize the
nation's banking industry in May of 1990, the move was hailed by both the
domestic and foreign business community as the needed impetus for bringing
capital investment back to Mexico.5 9 Although nationalization had not
weakened the fundamental infrastructure of Mexican banks in the same way in
which it had in other industries, President Portillo's September 1982 legislative
enactments had led the banking sector to grow in what many characterized as a

"lopsided manner".' Critics charged that while the banks did generate profits,
which were invested in technology and product expansion, reserve requirements
of 90 percent meant that banks took deposits from the public and lent the funds
to the state, thereby halting commercial lending to private businesses for most
of the decade.61 Moreover, a vacuum in the area of home mortgage lending
had been created.62 Clearly, for a country in need of debt relief, the sale of
the nation's state-run banking sector represented a golden opportunity to reduce
its debt burden.
President Salinas' state-of-the-nation address in December 1989 made many
people realize that the nation's banks would become a target for privatization.
In his address, the President neglected to mention the banking industry as an
area which should remain in the public domain.' Moreover, during a trip to
Europe in early 1990, the president indicated that a change in the nation's
constitution would be required before any type of privatization program could
be initiated.' This of course included the banks.

'9Green, Banksfor Sale: Mexico Could See Up to $ 18 Billion, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND
COMMERCIAL, Oct. 30, 1990, at 5A.

o Marray, Privatization Can Be a Complicated Process, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1990, at 163.
61id.
62Id.
' See Laurie, Aperture of Opportunity, THE BANKER, Apr. 1990, at 51.
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During January 1990, Congress amended several of Mexico's banking
regulations,' including granting foreign investors access to the nation's
financial institutions.' The legislative package also contained a provision
authorizing the integration of financial consortiums, something that had
previously been prohibited by the government.67 This legislation provides a
basic framework for the future creation of non-bank holding. companies in
Mexico.' This means that the private sector will be able to have a controlling
interest in three financial service areas - brokerage, insurance, and foreign
exchange.69 President Salinas is trying to foster rapid financial sector growth
by creating these groups, rather than depending solely on bank privatization.
Yet, these holding companies could play a pivotal role in the purchase of the
nation's banks.
On May 2, 1990, President Salinas submitted a constitutional amendment
to the Mexican Congress, which in effect authorized the reprivatization of the
nation's banks. 7" The amendment was approved on June 10, 1990 by a two
thirds vote of the Congress.71 Subsequently, on July 18, 1990, the Congress
approved a,new law governing credit institutions and one regulating financial
groups.72 The rules governing the privatization of Mexican banks have been
summarized in the New York Law Journal' and are reproduced here in order
to facilitate an informed analysis of this legislation and to compare it with the
laws covering other industries, particularly the regulations concerning
TELMEX:
1. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Hacienda) will review and
approve a plan to be prepared and submitted by the board of directors
of each Mexican bank for the reorganization thereof as a regular
mercantile corporation. The plan will include the procedure for the
exchange of the outstanding certificates of contributi6n for new shares
of common stock.

6

Mitchell, Privatizationof Mexican Banks, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 26, 1990, at 3(3).

6id.
67

Id.

I

See Laurie, supra note 63, at 52.

69

id.

11 See Mitchell, supra note 65, at 3.
711d.

721d.
7 Id.
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2. The new law provides that there will be three types of stock in Mexican
banks, which will be issued in exchange for the outstanding certificates
of contribution as follows:
A. 51 percent of the outstanding Series A certificates of contribution
(which are currently owned by the Mexican government) will be
exchanged for Series A common shares. This series of shares will
represent at all times at least 51 percent of the capital stock of each
bank and may be acquired only by Mexican individuals, the
Mexican government or Mexican holding corporations organized
in accordance with the law to regulate financial groups.
B. The remaining Series A. certificates (which currently represent up
to an additional 15 percent of the capital stock of each bank) and
all Series B certificates will be converted into Series B common
shares that may be acquired by those persons qualified as holders
of Series A shares as mentioned above as well as by Mexican
private corporations that are not directly or indirectly controlled by
foreigners and insurance and investment companies. Series B
common shares can represent up to 49 percent of the capital stock
of each bank. Upon reorganization of each bank, the present
holders of Series B certificates of contribution (most of which are
stock exchange investors) will be entitled to withdraw from the
reorganized corporation within 90 days following the date on which
the decrees of reorganization become effective. Such holders will
receive reimbursement for their certificates, at book value.
C. Foreign investment will be restricted to no more than thirty percent
of any bank. In this respect, Foreign investors that are not
controlled by foreign governments or government entities will be
allowed to acquire only Series C common shares, which series may
represent up to 30 percent of the capital stock of each bank. The
issuance by any bank of Series C common shares must be
previously approved by the Mexican government. No foreign
government or foreign official governmental agency will be
allowed to hold at any time a participation in any bank.
Also, in accordance with the law for the promotion of Mexican
investment and the regulation of foreign investment (Ley para
Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion
Extranjera), which provides that the participation of foreign
investment in the capital stock of each such corporation, such
foreign investors will only be able to have a 30 percent minority
participation in the administration of the reorganized banks and
therefore will not be able to make major decisions as to how the
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banks will be run.
Foreign investment will not be permitted in the development banks
(e.g. Banco Obrero, S.A.), which will continue to be organized as
National Credit Institutions in which the Mexican Government will
hold at least 66 percent of the relevant certificates of contribution,
and it is unlikely that the Mexican government will allow foreign
investors to hold a majority interest in Mexican Banks.
3. No single individual or corporation will be permitted to hold more than
5 percent of the paid-in capital stock of a single bank at any time,
except for the Mexican government and certain institutional investors
and holding corporations organized under the law to regulate financial
groups. However, Hacienda can make an exception to this principle
and allow a private entity to hold up to 10 percent of the capital stock
of a bank.
4. The administration of each bank will be vested in a board of directors
consisting of 11 members or other multiples of 11. Series A
shareholders will be entitled to appoint six members of such board, and
Series B shareholders can appoint up to five members. Series C
shareholders will only be allowed to appoint one director for each 10
percent of paid-in capital that they hold, and any such director will
reduce the number of directors that Series B shareholders can appoint.
5.

All current obligations and liabilities of the Mexican banks, whether of
a fiscal, labor or other nature will remain outstanding upon their
reorganization as private corporations.

Having explained the reprivatization process - the question arises as to who
the most likely buyers will be. Many people expect that they will be the same
financiers who were at the helm of the nation's banks prior to their
expropriation.74 Indeed, under the regulations dealing with financial groups,
such individuals could potentially hold 5 percent or perhaps 10 percent, with
government approval, of the holding companies that would run the banks.75
The government has made it clear that it will closely scrutinize buyers, in order
to prevent those who once dominated the industry from regaining control.76

I See Brown, Familiar Faces Tough Rules in Selloff of Mexico's Banks,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 15.
7 See Marray, supra note 60, at 163.
76 See Brown, supra note 74, at 15.
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Furthermore, as 2(C) of the foregoing regulations make clear, foreigners
will only be allowed to purchase a total of 30 percent of a bank and have nonvoting shares. This provision is somewhat worrisome and represents a more
restrictive view than other privatization legislation. Although domestic interest
in bank sales will be high enough to satiate the Mexican economy, it is evident
that foreign bankers are weary of investing in such a dicey undertaking without
having control.' Indeed, it has been reported that the restrictions on foreign
ownership have "dampened" interest by banks outside Mexico.78 Before those
banks begin investing, they will want a clear picture of who is exercising
leadership at those banks.
The purpose of the privatization of banks is not only to obtain quick capital
but also to look at long term technological growth. If the Mexican government
wants to advance technologically in banking it must immediately permit full
foreign participation in the banking sector. Otherwise, this short term infusion
of capital from domestic investors could whittle away without foreign capital or
foreign technology which is sorely needed for advancement. The legislative
framework does provide an arena for improvement in banking services in
Mexico, and the Salinas initiative is indeed commendable. But in the area of
banking, and having said that the banking sector is no longer strategic, the
President should open it up more fully to outside investment, thereby bringing
a more immediate and sustained influx of capital and technology to the nation.
VII. CONCLUSION

The transfer of much of Mexico's public sector, including capital
infrastructure to the private sector, represents a fundamental change in the
economic arrangements that have traditionally characterized the country. The
Salinas initiative, although flawed in some aspects, is a bold new undertaking
which is both widespread and, to.date, quite successful. It represents a good
opportunity for American investment.
Unfortunately, the paucity of information available to Americans about the
program means that potential Mexican investment opportunities could go to the
Europeans or the Japanese. At the very least, this broad survey of the Salinas
privatization program should serve to illuminate some vital aspects about the
new investment opportunities being offered by Mexico.
Indeed, the
government's willingness to surrender more than 51 percent of some industries
previously considered strategic means that the country is gearing up for full

77 Id.
7

Id.
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fledged capitalism. With the advent of velvet revolutions throughout Eastern
Europe, competition among countries for American investment is likely to be
fierce. Therefore, the Mexican government should accelerate its privatization
program and permit even greater foreign participation in its economy.
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Appendix 1 79
SOME OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
TO BE PRIVATIZED

NAME

LINE OF BUSINESS

Alto Homo de M6xico
Sicarsta

Steel
Steel

Siderdrgica Nacional
Tabacos Aztecas
Exportaciones Tabaco Mexicano
Aceitera Turboreactores
Compafifa Naviera Minera
del Golfo
Dina Autobuses
Dina Motores
Fdbrica de Tractores Agrfcolas
Petroqufmica de Mexico
Plsticos Automotrices
Tubacreo
Real del Montey Pachua
Inversiones Urbanas Monterrey
Telmex

Metal Foundry
Tobacco
Tobacco
Aircraft engines
Shipping
Transport Equipment
Truck engines
Tractors
Petrochemicals
Auto Parts
Steel Pipes
Gold and Silver Mining
Real State
Communications

Appendix 2

80

BASIC AND SECONDARY PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS

AFTER MEXICO'S RECLASSIFICATION
BASIC

Ammonia
Benzene
Butadiene
Carbon black
Dodecylbenzene
Ethane
Ethylene
Heptane
Hexane
Methanol

Robinson, supra note 13, at 13.
o Layton & Turner, supra note 7, at 25.

Methyl tertiary butyl ether
N-paraffins
Ortho-xylene
Para-xylene
Pentane
Propylene
Propylene tetramer
Tert amyl methyl ether
Toluene
Xylenes
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SECONDARY

2-ethyl hexanol
Acetaldehyde
Acetic anhydride
Acetylene
Acetone
Acetone cyanohydrin
Acetonitrile
Acrolein
Acrylonitrile
Acrylonitrile styrene
Acrylonitrile-butandiene-styrene
Alpha olefins
Ammonium Nitrate
Ammonium Phosphate
Ammonium Sulfate
Aniline
Butayraldehyde
Caprolactam
Chlorobenzenes
Chloromethanes
Chloroprene
Cumene
Cyanohydric acid
Cyclohexane
Cyclohexanone
Dichloroethane
Dimethyl terephthalate
Ethanolamine
Ethyl Chloride
Ethylamines
Ethylbenzene

Ethylene oxide
Ethylene-propylene copolymer
Formaldehyde
HDPE
Internal olefins
Isobutanol
Isobutyraldehyde
Isoprene
Isopropanol
LDPE
LLDPE
Maleic anhydride
Methyl methacrylate
Methylamines
N-butanol
Nitrobenzene
Nitrotoluene
Oxo alcohols
Paraformaldehyde
Pentaerythritol
Phenol
Phthalic anhydride
Polybutadiene
Polypropylene
Propylene oxide
Styrene
Styrene-butadiene oil
Terephthalic Acid
Urea
Vinyl Acetate monomer
Vinil Chloride

